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of securitization as a form of ‘organizational mimicry’, which highlights that techniques always rely 
for their functioning on locally rooted ‘cultures of practice’, suggesting that successful 
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also be traced in the geo-historical dispersal of securitization in Islamic markets. 
 
Keywords: Emerging markets, Gulf cities, Islamic finance, financial geography, IFCs 
 
JEL Classification: G01, G15, G24, N25, N95 
 
2 
 
1 Introduction 
On February 3rd 2011, when Egyptian protests added another day of mass-mobilizing at Tahrir square 
– protests which ultimately resulted in Mubarak’s downfall – the Dubai-based property developer 
Emaar launched its latest sukuk (Islamic bonds) on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), thereby 
reasserting its ambition to tap into global capital markets. As can be read of from the following 
communication by the Financial Times (FT, 2011) “the region’s largest developer, builder of the 
world’s tallest tower, issued the five-and-a-half-year Islamic bond as part of a broader US$2bn 
programme, paying a profit (equivalent interest) rate of 8.5 per cent (own emphasis added).” While at 
first glance unrelated, these two facts point to the paradoxical ubiquity of exceptionalism in 
knowledge production on the Arab world. On the one hand, the persistence of orientalist cum 
developmentalist perspectives on the Arab World are illustrated by the fact that the social and political 
upheaval denominated as the ‘Arab Spring’ is generally understood as the embodiment of a long-due 
transition towards modernity of a region that is hence perceived as not yet ‘modern’ or ‘developed’. 
Yet at the very same time, as is illustrated by the FT report quoted above, the financial geographies of 
the Arab world show intense insertion in ‘highly-advanced’ financial markets, which are feeding 
spectacular hyper-modern urban-centred growth throughout the Gulf region. 
 
However, as we discuss in this paper, exceptionalist readings of the Arab world are intensely 
propagated by often self-orientalising undercurrents within financial geographies of the Islamic world 
and the existing knowledge production thereon, even while the actual practices may prove otherwise. 
In particular, Islamic financial markets, which constitute the scope of this article, are persistently 
constructed as ‘different’, ‘non-conventional’ and even ‘exotic’. Discursively Islamic markets are 
constructed as non-conventional on the basis of their grounding in Islamic faith – not in the least by 
Islamic financial elites themselves. Islamic practices in turn are generally conceived to be taking place 
outside or, at best, ‘at the borders’ of conventional financial networks, thus remaining largely 
untouched by crises triggered by the ‘toxic assets’ that circulated widely in conventional circuits 
(Hasan and Dridi, 2010). In this paper, we critically engage with the alleged exceptional stance of 
Islamic markets and analyse what makes these markets in fact non-conventional or ‘Islamic’. We aim 
3 
 
to undertake such an effort because even a superficial glance at contemporary practices in Islamic 
securitization markets – for instance, the paying of profits equivalent to interest – suggests the 
complete opposite of these perceptions. In fact, as the issuance of the Emaar Sukuk on the LSE 
illustrates, ‘Islamic’ products are gaining prominence in conventional investment portfolios. 
Moreover, this issuance also suggests that evolutions in Islamic markets are in line with the broad-
scale globalization and financialization of Middle Eastern economies, whereby Gulf international 
financial centres in particular are becoming regular nodes on global financial flows.  
 
This paper then sets out to answer the difficult question of how concepts and practices of ‘the Islamic’ 
and ‘finance’ can be merged. In other words, we aim to analyse how ‘Islamic’ Islamic finance ‘really’ 
is in its contemporary form and what could be the implications of the potential discrepancies or 
similarities with conventional products, both for the way in which we conceptualize the process of 
globalization of Gulf financial markets and of financialization itself. To this end the paper focuses on 
the differences and similarities between standard Anglo-American securitization and securitization 
Islam style. As such the paper adds to a young but growing body of research on the geographies of 
securitization, which is geared towards studying how securitization adapts itself to various contexts. 
Wainwright (2009) spelled out how the technique first ended up in the UK, and how that required 
subtle adaptation in both technique and legal context. Aalbers et al. (2011) pursued this agenda and 
focused on residential mortgage backed securitization in the Netherlands, emphasizing in particular 
the responsive role of regulators to facilitate the growth of the securitization market in the 
Netherlands. Recently, a couple of agency reports have undertaken similar investigations of 
securitization in Italy, Denmark, and Australia (Albertazzi et al., 2011; Frankel et al., 2004; 
Rajapakse, 2005). The emphasis in these studies is more on what has made securitization in these 
latter three countries ‘safer’ than in the US than on the modifications that were required to make it 
work in the first place.  
 
Here we aim to take the main thrust of such a body of literature on securitization – the basic 
observation of the ‘plurality’ of global finance, which also reverberates what Brenner et al. (2010) 
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have called variegated neoliberalism – a step further. One way would be to frame this plurality as a 
cultural issue that has been described by anthropologists as ‘vernacular modernity’ or ‘multiple 
modernities’. Following recent anthropological studies that have demonstrated that ‘global modernity 
is always site-specific’ (Appadurai, 1996; Eisenstadt, 2000; Knauft, 2002), our study will suggest that 
the ‘hypermodern’ field of finance too appears to be ‘plural because in every local site modernity is 
brought into social existence in a tension-filled relationship between local concerns and global forms 
of discursive and institutional power’ (Pieterse, 2000). Though clearly relevant, this anthropological 
point of view, however, mostly operates at the scale of coherent societies and/or cultures and as such 
plays itself out at a level of abstraction that is too far removed from our empirics to be able account 
for the specifics of our case. A more fruitful approach, so we contend, is to interpret developments in 
Islamic securitization markets through the lens of literatures that have put ‘organizational mimicry’ at 
the centre of their analysis. As such we will confront research on geographies of securitization with 
insights that have been generated by the growing social science literature on what is termed ‘mimetic 
isomorphism’ in organizational sociology (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983 for the classic statement).  
 
While based on different theoretical perspectives and using different empirical vignettes to make their 
point, such a literature demonstrates convincingly that socio-technical assemblages that at first sight 
appear to be universally applicable in fact require subtle adaptations to be able to ‘work’ satisfactory 
in other environments than those of their gestation. For instance, economic historians have shown the 
impact of contextual changes on the back of detailed empirical investigations of the introduction of 
new managerial models, demonstrating that the introduction of these models generated unintended 
negative consequences which had to be repaired, either through adaptations in the models themselves 
or in the legal, social, cultural environment or both (Djelic, 1998; Zeitlin and Herrigel, 2000). 
Recently this approach has increasingly been applied to account for the attempts by transnational 
professional elites to construct supranational conventions for accountancy, bookkeeping, financial 
management and other widely used ‘metrics’ (Djelic and Quack, 2007). Geographers have been quick 
to focus on the variegated spatial articulations of these ‘metrics’ and their professions, and have 
investigated the role of MBA’s in furthering financial knowledge (Hall, 2006; 2008; Hall and 
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Appleyard, 2009), of legal firms in promulgating a particular view of legal professionalism 
(Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2009), the ‘construction’ of a transnational executive market by 
headhunters (Beaverstock et al., 2010) as well as the role of analysts and fund managers in 
‘constructing’ global asset categories (Lai, 2006; Sidaway and Bryson, 2002; Sidaway and Pryke, 
2000).   
 
In all of the above instances, the story is basically the same: models, techniques, technologies, 
administrative conventions, organizational blueprints do not simply consist of standard operating 
procedures that reduce agents to mere rule takers, but are embedded in mostly implicit and mostly 
local cultures of practices that either have to be imitated or reworked into the mimetized artefact to 
make them function, conceptually transforming agents from pure rule takers into partial rule makers. 
As our case on Islamic securitization will show such processes are fundamental in contemporary 
practices of global finance. To make our point the paper is structured as follows. The next section 
provides quantitative background information on the growth of the sukuk market. Section three traces 
the spatial history of securitization in the Islamic world through a qualitative description of the 
different sukuk markets. The fourth section then presents in more detail the case of the Emaar Sukuk 
to demonstrate the spatial and content-wise interconnectedness of Islamic finance with mainstream 
financial players and markets. Section five discusses the differences and similarities of Islamic sukuk 
structures with Anglo-American securitization, framing it as an instance of organizational mimicry 
and asking how to weigh what is different and similar. The final section wraps up and draws some 
tentative conclusions from this study for the remit of economic geography and the kind of cross-
disciplinary dialogues it should engage in post crisis. 
 
2 Size and scale of the sukuk market 
Throughout the Islamic world, Islamic finance is growing as a set of powerful discourses and 
practices that mediate integration into global financial circuits (see Bassens et al., 2010a). Drawing on 
Shari’a Law, Islamic finance renounces all interest (riba), gambling (maysir) and contractual 
ambiguities (gharar) that lead to excessive risk taking. It also shies away from investment in certain 
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products (e.g., pork meat, weaponry, alcohol, etc.) that are considered haram. Fundamentally, Islamic 
finance opposes the conventional debt-trading and promotes a system of profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) 
as the main regulatory mechanism of financial intermediation (Pollard and Samers, 2007). As was 
spelled-out elsewhere (Bassens et al., 2011a), the growth of Islamic finance was strongly fuelled by 
the combination of the Middle East oil boom and a broad reassertion of Islam in Muslim societies 
from the 1970s onward. Since then Islamic finance has been around, but it is only since the turn of the 
millennium that Islamic markets are expanding and globalizing rapidly – an evolution no doubt 
related to wider geo-economic shifts epitomized by the rise of emerging economies in ‘the East’ 
(Derudder et al., 2011, Taylor et al, 2009).  
 
As Islamic markets ‘mature’, they are increasingly confronted with the need for financial products and 
mechanisms that enable Islamic financial institutions to operate on a global scale. In ‘conventional’ 
debt-based markets, assets-backed securities (ABS), mortgage-backed securities (MBS), collateralized 
debt obligations (CDO), and other products of structured finance have played a crucial role in 
integrating markets, mainly from the early 1980s onwards. According to Leyshon and Thrift (2007), 
the technique of securitization became popular for mainly three reasons. First, it allowed firms to 
access capital markets directly instead of receiving finance through bank loans. Second, large 
institutional investors such as pension funds were actively searching for products to diversify their 
portfolios. Third, and crucially, securitization was propelled by the financial sector’s preoccupation to 
transfer liabilities off-balance. This enabled them to circumvent capital ratio’s imposed by the Basel I 
and II agreements, which limited the size of outstanding loans vis-à-vis equity capital and thus the 
bank’s ability to make profits and pay out bonuses (Aalbers et al., 2011). Crucially, the resulting 
products were increasingly being traded across the globe, creating deep and liquid secondary markets.   
 
Islamic markets, on the other hand, are relatively young and illiquid. As they evolve and globalize, 
however, they seemingly relive evolutions that took place in debt-based markets. Like in 
‘conventional’ markets disintermediation through securitization offers cheaper finance and longer 
maturity terms than bank loans. Islamic bankers and regulators are therefore actively looking for ways 
7 
 
to build a more active (in terms of trade) and integrated market. There are, however, at least three 
idiosyncrasies that drive the demand for Islamic securitization. First, there is a pressing need for 
investment products – perhaps even more than in ‘conventional’ markets because of excess liquidity 
in key Islamic markets. Especially in the Gulf, oil-rich sovereign and private investors are looking for 
attractive investment products (e.g., securities, commodities, investment notes) with a Shari’a-
compliant character. These investors are either Islamic private financial institutions such as takaful 
(Islamic insurance) companies and investment funds, but also various oil-based sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs), which are not ‘Islamic’ per se. For instance, the largest SWF in the Gulf, the Abu 
Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), has an estimated asset value of US$875 billion (Behrendt, 
2008). The mere size of these amassed assets has attracted international service firms, such as 
investment banks and law firms to the home-bases of this and other SWFs (e.g., Abu Dhabi, Doha, 
Dubai), in their attempt to capture a share of the business (Clark et al., 2010a). Second, the rapid 
growth of Gulf cities and related infrastructure and real estate developments is driving the need for 
finance products. These projects constitute an attractive market for regional and global investors (e.g., 
UK or American investment banks, see Bassens et al., 2010b) and serve as the feedstock for Islamic 
securitization chains. Third, Islamic intermediaries themselves are in urgent need for liquidity 
management (LM) tools, which could be found in securitization products. In the conventional system, 
banks can perform LM through short-term interest-bearing loans. Islamic banks, however, cannot 
access these debt-based markets (because of the riba prohibition) and the sector itself lacks a 
developed inter-bank market. Currently, LM mostly happens via the tawarruq mechanism at the 
London Stock Exchange, a hiyal (stratagem) whereby short-term lending is circumvented through the 
buying and on-the-spot selling of precious metals. Although this structure is Shari’a-compliant in 
form, it does not address the need for products and techniques that provide Shari’a-compliance in 
substance, thus reproducing the need for proper ‘Islamic’ techniques.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
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In response to these caveats, financialization techniques such as Islamic securitization have emerged 
since the 1990s, resulting in an array of sukuk structures, which are basically Islamic asset-based or 
asset-backed investment notes (Jobst, 2007). These structures are increasingly connecting localized 
assets such as real estate projects in Gulf cities with global financial circuits. As illustrated in Figure 
1, the global sukuk market has been growing at a steady pace since the turn of the millennium, both in 
terms of size and number of issuances, only to be withheld briefly during the 2008-2009 crisis. This 
temporary fall-back in itself illustrates the highly globalized nature of Islamic markets, with issuers 
suffering from low investment appetite at the time. However, this dip in sukuk issuance was also 
related to more ‘local’ events such as the Dubai debt crisis, which tipped off in 2009, almost leading 
to the default of Nakheel’s US$4 billion sukuk (Bassens et al., 2010b). Furthermore, as will be 
detailed below, the sukuk dip was also closely related to an existential crisis in the Islamic finance 
sector, triggered by the AAOIFI1 president Taqi Usmani fatwa on the non-Shari’a-compliant nature of 
most sukuk on the market. Recent issuance levels, however, are surpassing pre-crisis highs.  
 
As per June 30, 2009 the total amount of outstanding sukuk equalled US$136 billion (IIFM, 2010). 
Most of these sukuk, that is ca. US$101 billion, are so-called ‘domestic’ issuances denominated in 
local currencies, aiming to attract investors at the national or regional scale. The other US$35 billion, 
however, are ‘international’, mostly dollar-denominated designed to attract investors from outside the 
national or regional realm. This global investor break-down suggests that sukuk are gaining 
popularity, not only with Muslim investors, but also with non-Muslim investors who seek to diversify 
their investment portfolios. As illustrated in Table 1, Malaysia is dominating domestic issuance, while 
the Gulf is leading the way in terms of international sukuk. For reasons of Shari’a-compliance, which 
favours investment in the ‘real’ economy, sukuk finance in both regions has an intimate link with 
‘tangible’ assets, either in real estate and property development, large infrastructure works 
                                                            
1
 The Bahrain-based Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) is one 
of the most influential standard-setting regulatory bodies for Islamic financial institutions. These standards 
include (i) accounting and auditing rules; (ii) Shari’a governance rules; (iii) a code of ethics for financial 
auditors and employees; and (iv) standards concerning the actual financial practices, products, investments, etc. 
that fall under the concepts of Islamic banking, finance, and insurance (see website AAOIFI, 
http://www.aaoifi.com, accessed May 26, 2011). 
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(highways), industrial infrastructure (petrochemical sector), or infrastructure with a focus on building 
global connectivity (e.g., airlines, port operations, etc.).  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
To further deepen our understanding of sukuk markets, we have collected key information on 269 
maturing sukuk (due December 2009 or later), with an approximate total value of US$117 billion. The 
data set has been comprised by scanning various data sources, such as websites of Islamic securities 
exchanges, Islamic regulatory bodies, and others. We have screened all major exchanges in the 
Muslim world and prominent global exchanges involved in Islamic finance. This resulted in a 
relatively small number of exchanges that list Islamic products, namely Dubai Financial Market, 
Nasdaq Dubai, Labuan Financial Exchange, London Stock Exchange, Luxembourg Stock Exchange, 
Bahrain Stock Exchange, Dow Jones, and Tadawul Riyadh. Since a lot of the outstanding sukuk are 
not listed, we have broadened the scope of the data set with additional info provided by Islamic 
regulators, such as sukuk approved by the Securities Commission (Malaysia), or which have been 
arranged by Liquidity Management Centre (Bahrain). In addition, extra data were collected from 
private market analysts such as Bloomberg (www.bloomberg.com), Failaka Advisors 
(www.failaka.com), Zawya (www.zawya.com), and promotional agencies such as the Al Huda Center 
of Islamic Banking and Finance (www.alhudacibe.com), based in Pakistan. Although not exhaustive, 
the range of sources used, guarantees a detailed and ‘global’ overview of sukuk issuance. In many 
cases detailed information on individual issuances, such as activities and location of the seller and the 
bank(s) that arranged the sukuk, could be retrieved from investment circulars.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
As illustrated in Table 2, the resulting data set contains information on the nature of the financed 
projects, the identity of the seller, the arranger/manager of the issuance (e.g., global banks or regional 
Islamic banks), and the place of listing on international markets. Reviewing the entire data set 
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produced further insight in the geographical market differences between the two heartlands of sukuk 
issuance, Malaysia and the Gulf. In Malaysia, sukuk are often state-based initiatives to finance these 
large infrastructural works through national investments in ringgit-denominated sukuk. While this is 
also true for the Gulf, with sukuk used to attract domestic oil-money via dirham- or riyals-
denominated products, dollar-denominated sukuk are used as a vehicle to attract international 
investors via listings on regional and international exchanges. When it comes to the actors involved in 
the structuring process, most Malaysian issuances are arranged and managed by domestic banks such 
as CIMB, Aseambankers, Bank Muamalat Berhad, and others. In the Gulf, on the other hand, issuance 
is often co-managed by Gulf-based Islamic banks – Bahrain Islamic Bank, Emirates NBD, Dubai 
Islamic Bank, Gulf Finance House, Kuwait Finance House, Al Rahji Bank, Noor Islamic Bank, etc. – 
and large international banks such as Barclays, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Standard Chartered, JP 
Morgan, and Citigroup. Second, also in terms of listing there are marked differences. Malaysian 
sukuk are mostly traded bilaterally in Over-The-Counter (OTC) markets and hence rarely listed. Gulf 
sukuk, on the other hand, are frequently listed on international exchanges such as Bahrain, Nasdaq 
Dubai, LSE, Luxembourg SE, Tadawul, etc. These listings, however, do not imply active trading 
since most sukuk are held until maturity, making secondary markets illiquid to almost non-existent. 
The existence of such spatial variegation in sukuk markets is closely related to the geo-historical 
evolution of Islamic securitization itself, a topic to which we turn in the next section. 
 
3 A geo-historical account of Islamic securitization 
The overview in the previous section has banned the possible misconception of viewing the sukuk 
market as a robust and well-integrated ‘entity’. In fact quite the contrary is actually the case: Not only 
do sukuk markets show intense geographical variegation, they also vary greatly in terms of underlying 
contracts. As defined by Article 2 of AAOIFI’s Shari’a standards, sukuk are “certificates of equal 
value representing undivided shares in ownership of tangible assets, usufruct and services or (in the 
ownership of) the assets of particular projects or special investment activity”. In practice this 
definition is more a rule of thumb than a crisp legal constraint, since very few issued sukuk actually 
live up to this definition. According to Shari’a scholar Mohammad Daud Bakar (2010) sukuk can be 
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broadly divided in four categories, depending on their product design, product offering, pay off to 
investors, and rating methodology, which contrast with the above-suggested uniformity. They can be 
identified as either: (i) debt-based; (ii) asset-based; (iii) project-based; or (iv) asset-backed sukuk. 
Chronologically, there has been a general trend away from the first debt-based category, towards the 
latter, with asset-backed securitization as the most recent innovation in the field of Islamic 
securitization. With each new step, the assets that underlie the structure gain importance in terms of 
being the actual source of revenue for the sukuk investors. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 2 provides a brief overview of how sukuk markets have evolved since the early 1990s, and 
how this ‘travel log’ was accompanied by geographical dispersal. Sukuk have evolved gradually to 
comprise a vast and variegated array of products that vary in terms of structure, securitized assets, and 
underlying contracts. A first and crucial development for the opening-up of Islamic markets to 
securitization was the decision of the Jeddah-based Islamic Fiqh Academy in 1988 that assets could to 
be bundled and represented by a bond, which could then be sold at market price, provided “the group 
of assets, represented by the security, consists of a majority of physical assets and financial rights, 
with only a minority being cash and interpersonal debts” (www.fiqhacademy.org, accessed September 
20, 2010). Islamic markets, however, only gradually opened-up to securitization following the 
blessing of the influential voices of Shari’a scholars at the Fiqh Academy. Not the Gulf Region, but 
Malaysia, which is usually considered more lenient in its interpretation of Shari’a Law, was the first 
to experience the introduction of securitization. The first sukuk were issued there in 1990 by Shell 
MDS (also Global Oil Corp.) and were structured as Islamic debt of RM125 million (ca. US$30 
million) based on receivables securitization (bai’ bithamin ajil, BBA) (Thomas et al., 2005, 159). The 
structure consisted of a deferred payment sale at a pre-agreed price with a profit margin agreed by 
both parties, which made it in essence a mark-up product similar to a conventional bond. Soon after 
this pioneering issuance the Malaysian market saw the growth of similar corporate Islamic debt 
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structures. As in conventional interest-based markets, Islamic markets have been generally established 
through sovereign sukuk, which could then be used as a benchmark for corporate issuances.  
From Malaysia, sukuk securitization spread to Gulf Islamic markets, and was gradually introduced 
from 2001 onward via sovereign issuances in Bahrain (Bahrain Monetary Agency, 2001) and Qatar 
(Qatar Global sukuk, 2002), later followed by (quasi-)sovereign and corporate issuances in the UAE 
and Saudi Arabia (Wilson, 2004). Notwithstanding their success in Malaysian markets, debt-based 
structures such as BBA were considered unacceptable in the Gulf because of their similarities with 
debt-based bonds. As they entered Gulf markets, sukuk had to accommodate to stricter Shari’a 
interpretations and were actively moulded by the teams of lawyers and bankers that structured the 
deals. This was because while the contracts proper that underpin debt-based structures were 
considered Shari’a-compliant (e.g., murabahah (cost-plus financing), ijarah (lease), or istisna’a 
(manufacturing contract)), the overarching sukuk structure was not, since the investors receive fixed 
payments that originate from the underlying contracts. Mainly from 2006 onwards, then, two 
‘innovations’ have been introduced in Islamic markets to structure sukuk more according to the profit-
and-loss-sharing principle, rather than using sukuk as a formal way to circumvent the Shari’a ban on 
debt-selling. These are project-based sukuk and ‘classic’ asset-backed securitization (ABS) structures. 
Both structures involve ‘true securitization’, without a fixed pay or no guaranteed return at the time of 
dissolution. In case of project-based sukuk the underlying contract is generally an istisna’a 
(manufacturing contract) or musharakah (diminishing partnership), and the pay-off to investors is to a 
degree related to the performance of the underlying assets. In asset-backed sukuk, which are usually 
based on mudarabah (passive partnership) or musharakah structures, the performance of sukuk is 
entirely linked to the real value and risk of the underlying assets (Daud Bakar, 2010), thus being 
completely in line with the PLS principle. Ironically, however, the Dubai debt crisis has shown that 
even real assets can be the object of intense speculation, making the build-on financial instruments 
equally speculative. Moreover, notwithstanding the discussed geo-historical developments towards 
true ABS, the most common (although also controversial) securitization technique in globalized Gulf 
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markets still involves selling assets to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) and leasing them back via a so-
called sukuk al-ijara – a technique that we will discuss in more depth in the next section. 
Lately, sukuk have also started to contribute to the further integration of Islamic markets at a global 
scale as sukuk structures are being exported to fit the demands of non-Muslim entities that wish to 
attract Gulf investments. In this context there have been a few ‘special issuances’ by corporate and 
sovereign bodies, such as the government of Saxony-Anhalt (2004), General Electric (2009), and 
International Finance Corporation (2004, 2009). These Islamic structures are likely to undergo a 
second round of adaptations to fit the regulatory regimes of non-Islamic markets. Given the budget 
problems in ‘developed’ economies at the moment, however, these issuances are unlikely to be the 
final instalment in the story of Islamic securitization. 
4 The case of Emaar Sukuk Limited  
Here we present a case-study of the above-mentioned Emaar Sukuk Limited, a recent international 
sukuk that aptly illustrates the globalized nature of Islamic securitization markets. The sukuk emitted 
by the Dubai-based Emaar Properties PJSC were launched on February 3rd, 2011 via the LSE for a 
total value of US$500 million as a first series of a larger issuance of US$2 billion. Emaar, partially 
owned by the Dubai government (ca. 32%) has been one of the main property developers in the 
emirate, which has constructed the gargantuan Burj Khalifa (formerly known as Burj Dubai), and 
which also has operations throughout the Middle East, North Africa, China, India, and Northern 
America. Since the inception of the global financial crisis and further augmented by the collapse of 
the Dubai real estate market in 2009, Emaar has found itself in rough seas, seeing its yearly profits 
melting away from annual levels of US$6,5 million in 2007 to US$0,3 million in 2009 (Financial 
Statements, downloaded from www.emaar.com, May 24th, 2011). Emaar was thus in urgent need for 
fresh investor money to offset losses and diversify away from the Dubai real estate market. Through 
this issuance Emaar has managed to raise the targeted US$500 million, which understates the success 
of the sukuk since they were oversubscribed more than three times (US$1.7 billion), echoing the 
success of pre-crisis issuances arising from the Gulf – a sign that investor confidence towards Dubai 
is apparently restored.  
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[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Figure 3, which we retrieved from the issuance prospectus (downloaded from 
www.londonstockexchange.com, May 20th, 2011), presents a basic and highly simplified view of the 
underlying securitization structure. In essence the structure presented here is centred on an ijarah sale-
and-lease-back operation, between the obligor Emaar Properties PJSC which sells assets to a 
bankruptcy-proof SPV, the issuer Emaar Sukuk Limited, which issues sukuk and sells them to the end-
investors (the sukuk holders) to purchase these assets. After this initial sale, Emaar Properties PJSC 
(lessee) leases the sold assets from the SPV (lessor), generating a cash-flow which is channelled to the 
certificate holders. When the sukuk mature, the assets are bought back by the obligor and this amount 
is used to repay the principal amount to the investors. The simplicity and transparency suggested by 
this securitization structure, however, greatly obscures the multiplicity of actors and institutions 
involved in the securitization process, and understate the complexity of the multiscalar networks 
producing and operating even such ‘basic’ a sukuk structure. Figure 4, therefore aims to provide what 
is admittedly still a simplified overview of the global geographies of such multilayered securitization 
networks, in this case geared towards the Emaar sukuk. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
As shown in figure 4 a first type of networks revolves around the structuring of the deal, reflecting the 
geographies of the obligor, the issuer and the investment banks that have arranged the deal. Although 
it entails a Dubai-based company, the legal entity issuing the sukuk, the SPV called Emaar Sukuk 
Limited, is registered on the Cayman Islands to reap the benefits of off-shoring. The deal itself is 
arranged from London from the offices of HSBC, Standard Chartered, The Royal Bank of Scotland, 
and Dubai Islamic Bank operating from Dubai. The structuring process is screened in terms of 
Shari’a-compliance by HSBC in-house ‘Central Shari’a Committee’ and Standard Chartered’s 
‘Shari’a Supervisory Committee’. The screening by two teams consisting of three Shari’a scholars 
each no doubt instils investor confidence in the Shari’a-compliance of the sukuk. However, a closer 
15 
 
look at the boards’ constitution reveals that the screening actually involves only four scholars, of 
whom two are sitting on both boards. This situation echoes broader trends of Shari’a board 
interlocking, which have been identified as potential means for Shari’a standard setting at the level of 
financial institutions themselves (Bassens et al., 2011b). 
A second set of networks supports the management of the sukuk structure. The first ‘role’ involves the 
ownership and administration of the issuing SPV. The management thereof is not provided by the 
obligor Emaar Properties, but rather by a licensed trust company called Maples Finance Limited, 
which is operating from the Cayman Islands. As in conventional securitization, this means that 
securitization requires a so-called trust deed, which implies a transfer of title to a trustee (in this case 
Maples Finance Limited), which will hold it as a security for the investors. In common law 
jurisdictions this particular construction enables the parties to enjoy the benefits of off-shoring, while 
limiting the recourse of investors to the assets itself. However, whereas the above is similar to 
conventional securitization, the particularities of Islamic securitization have generated the need for an 
entirely new role. From a conventional perspective, Islamic structures would require the SPV not only 
to act as the issuer of sukuk, but also as a trustee holding the underlying assets on trust for the 
certificate holders. This has led to the creation the role of a ‘delegate’, who is responsible for holding 
the assets. This role is again fulfilled by a trust company, in this case the London-based HSBC 
Corporate Trustee Company (UK) Limited.  
This leads us to consider a third type of networks, namely those reflecting the networks that link up 
sukuk with (potential) investors. One way to attract investors is via a listing of the sukuk at an official 
stock exchange. To get listed at the LSE for example, as is the case of Emaar Sukuk Limited, the 
structured products need to be rated by at least two rating agents. Here ratings were provided by 
Moody’s (B1) and Standard and Poor’s (BB), who have both identified them as high-risk junk bonds. 
To instil investor confidence a reliable auditor (in this case Ernst & Young, Dubai) is involved in 
providing the necessary documentation for the issuance, such as the sukuk prospectus itself, which 
includes the financial statements of the obligor Emaar Properties. Most sukuk investment, however, is 
emitted and traded bilaterally in so-called Over-The-Counter (OTC) markets, which necessitates the 
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use of interdealer-brokers as mediators between sellers and buyers. Such brokers usually buy an entire 
series of trust certificates and may then decide to sell them to end-investors. In this case the brokers 
were located in London (BNP Paribas, HSBC Bank, Merrill Lynch International, The Royal Bank of 
Scotland), Dubai (Standard Chartered Bank), and Singapore (DBS Bank), which illustrates the global 
investment breakdown for these particular sukuk: European investors accounted for 52% of the 
transaction, while Middle East, Asian and US (offshore) investors accounted for 38%, 7% and 3%, 
respectively, of the issuance. In terms of investor type, the offering was distributed as follows: 60% 
for Fund Managers, 29% for Banks, 8% for Private Banks and 3% for Insurance Companies (Dubai 
Chronicle, 2011). Once the connection with investors is made, further servicing involves the 
registration of the certificate holders (registrar), the calculation of payments (calculation agent), and 
making payment to the investors (principal paying agent and transfer agent). In this case all tasks are 
performed by HSBC Bank (London) where the sukuk are listed.  
Fourth and finally, the entire process also requires intense interaction with networks of legal firms 
who provide knowledge of the multiple jurisdictions being crosscut by the securitization chain, even 
though the overarching structure itself falls under English and UAE law. In this case this means that 
knowledge (i) of UAE and English law is provided by Allen & Overy and Linklaters (both based in 
Dubai International Financial Centre, DIFC) to the obligor (and also to the brokers in case of Allen & 
Overy), (ii) of Cayman Islands law is provided by Maples and Calder (also from the DIFC) to the 
issuer, and (iii) of English law is provided Allen & Overy (from their London office) to the sukuk 
delegate in London.  
Overall, the case of Emaar Sukuk Limited highlights the interlocking of Gulf sukuk markets with 
‘conventional’ institutions, operating from mainstay International/Offshore Financial Centres 
(IFC/OFCs).2 While this can be read as a straightforward illustration of the intense globalization of 
Islamic securitization markets, the transnational financial space sustained by such interconnectedness 
also serves as a platform for transplantation of financial techniques, ideologies, cultures, practices, 
                                                            
2
 See Palan et al., 2010 for the argument that many IFCs double as OFCs and in fact provide financial firms with 
a double coded jurisdiction. 
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and discourses. This transplantation is the result of the actions of financial elites, who can wield a set 
of conventional structured finance techniques, which they mutatis mutandis deploy to capture new 
and profitable markets. Seemingly sukuk structuring teams are borrowing the blueprint of 
securitization techniques originating in ‘conventional’ markets, and are using it as a panacea to find 
existing or innovate ways around Islamic prohibitions to build Shari’a-compliant products. Indeed, as 
we will argue in the next section, the above-sketched geographies of ‘entanglement’ (Callon, 1998; 
Maurer, 2005) involve a large degree of ‘mimicking’ of conventional structuring techniques (Khan, 
2010).  
 
5 Discussion: Differences and similarities with ‘conventional’ securitization structures 
These processes of transplantation and mimicking become visible when we compare the Emaar Sukuk 
structure (Figure 3) with a typical handbook Anglo-American securitization. Of course, as illustrated 
above, sukuk securitization is characterized by particularities at various points of the securitization 
chain: (i) the structuring process requires screening by Shari’a scholars to verify the Shari’a-
compliance of the sukuk; (ii) the management of the structure requires the introduction of a 
‘delegate’, charged with the management of the securitized assets; (iii) sukuk investments are made by 
conventional investors and Islamic investors, both from mainstay and emerging IFC/OFCs; and (iv) 
sukuk structures require operating in multiple legal jurisdictions, some of which are not governed by 
English law (e.g., UAE law). A superficial glance at the prospectus, however, shows that it is in fact 
very similar to a ‘conventional’ prospectus, featuring most of the usual terminology, notices to 
residents of various countries explaining their non-eligibility as investors, terms and conditions of the 
certificates, financial information of the obligor, etc. There are some differences, however, including a 
very transparent and elaborate discussion of the investment risks, which make reference to the risks 
linked to investing in emerging markets. However, when we skate over these superficial differences 
and dig deeper into the actual contractual structures supporting the issuance, it becomes obvious that 
sukuk are essentially very similar to ‘conventional’ debt-based structures such as bonds, but also vary 
significantly from structured finance products based on the securitization of income flows known 
from their role in the recent crisis (see Figure 5). 
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[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
This is because the structure of the securitization itself is much simpler than in conventional products 
such as RMBS. For instance, there is no mention of waterfalling or tranching that provides investors 
with different classes of bonds (equity, mezzanine, senior and super senior tranches) with different 
credit risk ratings and different interest rates. This overt simplicity strongly suggests that the 
technique of securitizing assets is used here as a mere stratagem to circumvent Shari’a rules, as they 
are ‘Islamic’ in form, but not in substance (Agha, 2009). This can be deduced from three 
observations.  
First, in common asset-based structures certificate holders do not receive periodic payments on a 
variable profit-and-loss sharing basis, but instead receive a fixed interest rate that is often 
benchmarked to LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate). As for the Emaar sukuk, the trust 
certificates indeed return a fixed yield of 8.5 %, which makes the revenue for investors completely 
detached from the performance of the underlying assets. As with conventional debt-based products, 
then, it is the rating of the seller and not the assets that determines the sukuk rating. This explains 
why, contrary to a prospectus of ’conventional’ securitizations where the emphasis is on the 
underlying assets, sukuk prospectuses extensively detail the credit status and the background of the 
obligor. In this case, the obligor Emaar Properties is partially government-owned, which makes that 
its rating is linked to the overall creditworthiness of the Emirate of Dubai, which is precarious at the 
moment. Second, the agreement of purchase undertaking (PU) included in the contract, which binds 
the seller to repurchase the assets at maturity, guarantees the investments of the sukuk holders 
disregarding the actual performance or value of the underlying assets, and thus violates the PLS 
principle. Third, in asset-based structures such as the above no ‘true’ sale occurs, but rather a transfer 
to the issuer of a collection of ‘rights akin to ownership’ that allows the issuer to issue sukuk and 
enables the investor to participate in the revenues generated by the underlying assets. This means that 
investors have no recourse to assets, making the Emaar sukuk in fact unsecured obligations, which 
also explains the fixed interest rate paid on the notes. This limited recourse to underlying assets 
reflects the fact that non-residents are more than often not allowed to own or lease these Gulf assets 
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(Thomas et al., 2005, 158), which explains why until recently the ijarah approach was usually 
sufficient to satisfy Shari’a scholars. In November 2007 Taqi Usmani, the president of AAOIFI’s 
Shari’a Board has voiced the critique that sukuk are, in fact, nothing more than conventional debt. As 
the recent Emaar issuance, however, illustrates this critique has fallen on deaf ears with Islamic 
finance professionals and their Western handmaidens. 
How should we then interpret these similarities and idiosyncrasies of sukuk securitization? Do they 
suggest an unstoppable convergence towards an Anglo-American norm of financial modernity or do 
they project a mode of financial modernization whose modi operandi remain entangled in the 
requirements of Islamic traditionalism? Or do they instead suggest a complex negotiation of Islamic 
elites between development and cultural preservation resulting in unintended, undesigned socio-
technical hybrids with uncertain future paths of further development (Yeung 2004)? To answer this 
question we can consult a growing number of studies that have been conducted in organizational 
sociology around the concept of ‘organizational mimicry’ or ‘mimetic isomorphism’. These concepts 
were minted in the early 1980s by DiMaggio and Powell to capture the observation that organizations 
tend to imitate organizational models, management techniques and administrative technologies 
ascribed to reputational leaders within (and across) specific organizational fields in an attempt to 
‘follow’ and surpass the leader (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In their conception, organizational 
intentions were empirically often observed to be constrained by positional and contextual 
dissimilarities between ‘leader’ and ‘follower’, resulting in unintended outcomes and hybrid 
assemblages of the old and the new, the local and the global, the vernacular and the universal. 
 
Similar processes can be observed in our case, where Anglo-American techniques of securitization 
serve as a dominant, hegemonic template for mimicry by organizations at the boundaries of the 
dominant field. This mimicry operates both at the level of particular techniques as at the level of 
context itself. To begin with the latter, in many instances the environment too requires subtle changes 
to become more similar to the original environment and allow these socio-technical assemblages to 
function properly, where what is ‘proper’ is defined by elites circulating in bridging networks. The 
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adaptation of context is most evident from the emergence of a dotted geography of local ‘islands’ 
operating under the banner of common law legal frameworks (e.g., the Dubai International Financial 
Centre), which has allowed some Gulf cities to become nodes in global financial circuits that 
reproduce UK/US based legal systems off shore. Turning to the changes of financial techniques 
themselves, it appears that instead of beginning with a tabula rasa, Islamic securitization draws on 
techniques originating elsewhere that are redeployed and then undergo context-sensitive 
redevelopment. These contextual constraints and incentives emerge from economic factors, such as 
high oil liquidity and the need for mechanisms to finance the urban boom, as well as social, cultural, 
and religious factors grounded in a general reassertion of Shari’a-compliant discourses.  
 
Since Islamic financiers are mainly mirroring models that have originated in Anglo-American markets 
instead of the other way round, mimetic processes in Islamic markets are asymmetric, notwithstanding 
the willingness of Western firms and investors to tap into Islamic circuits of capital. This 
receptiveness to ‘foreign’ models in Islamic markets can be understood from the crucial role of 
analogy and consensus-building in the case-based formation of legal opinions of Shari’a scholars. 
This disposition has produced Islamic markets that are strongly marked by rent-seeking first-movers, 
who are stretching Shari’a rules to fit new and profitable fields such as Islamic securitization, but 
lately also Islamic credit cards and hedge funds, which seem Shari’a compliant but fundamentally 
violate ‘Islamic’ bans on interest, speculation, and excessive risk-taking. This does, however, not 
imply that mimicry happens in a ‘blind’ and straightforward fashion, as is suggested by classic 
stageist modernization narratives (Kerr, 1960; Parsons, 1966; Rostow, 1960; see critically Sheppard, 
2011). Rather, as was illustrated by the geo-historical account of Islamic securitization, these 
negotiations happen gradually and follow a ‘trial-and-error’-logic, thus constituting a complex and 
iterative process that echoes the kind of ‘bricolage’ discussed by Engelen et al. (2010) in the context 
of an analysis of the ‘securitization’ machine that wrecked Anglo-American finance in the recent 
crisis.  
 
21 
 
However, in terms of outcomes, we depart from the ‘isomorphism’ that DiMaggio and Powell 
postulate as the telos of mimicry, contending that their homogenizing viewpoint reflected a time (the 
early 1980s) when scholarly sensitivity to the durability of hybrid effects and outcomes was still in the 
process of gestation. In fact, the concept of hybridity only moved from evolutionary biology to the 
social sciences in the mid 1990s, suggesting a gradual departure from the homogenizing assumptions 
underlying modernization theory (Steinmetz, 2005). While we have demonstrated that mechanisms of 
homogenization are indeed at work in Islamic finance, they do not necessarily lead to isomorphism 
per se. Indeed, in Islamic securitization markets putatively similar tools and stratagems are used – 
notably the technique of off-shoring via a SPV which is the crux of securitization – but the aims of 
their employment move beyond the ‘regulatory arbitrage’ that is behind ‘conventional’ securitization 
markets. Rather, it appears that these exact same techniques are being used to circumvent regulations 
of Shari’a-compliance, thus leading to forms of ‘religious arbitrage’ instead (see El-Gamal, 2006).  
 
In sum, the above account of Islamic securitization suggests, counter to images of ‘empire-like’ neo-
colonization that straightforwardly leads to increased homogenization, the emergence of hybrid 
outcomes. These are mediated not only by financial elites employed by banks and service firms 
operating from ‘global cities’ and IFCs, but also mediated by ‘local’ financial actors such as Shari’a 
scholars, Islamic bankers, trust managers, regulatory bodies, and others operating from ‘local’ 
financial centres. Backed by religious authority and the power of substantive financial leverage 
(petrodollars), these local power brokers act as emerging markets’ ‘gatekeepers’, bridging and 
connecting metropolitan and peripheral networks and circuits, and through their trial-and-error 
negotiations co-producing something that to the outsider appears as financial integration and for the 
insider feels as opportunistic bricolage (Bassens et al., 2012; Engelen et al., 2010).  
 
6 Implications for economic geography 
The case-study presented here illustrates how global finance, its narratives, discourses, techniques, 
and agents, is fundamentally plural. As securitization diffuses through the social pipelines that 
undergird financial markets and is, through processes of organizational mimicry, introduced in new 
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contexts, the technique, structure, aims, and perceptions of securitization are simultaneously 
reproduced and altered to serve new contextual goals: religious arbitrage instead of regulatory 
arbitrage, dodging religious commandments rather than the prescripts of the central bank. This implies 
that while global finance unmistakably refers back to global discourses and practices, which crosscut 
national boundaries and transcend regulatory regimes, local and regional institutional variegation still 
influences and shapes the practice of global finance (Clark, 2005). Therefore, as Clark et al. (2010b, 
3) have recently argued, “[…] understanding the evolving economic landscape of twenty-first century 
capitalism will rely crucially on understanding the global and local practices and variegated 
institutional configurations of finance”.  
While we fully endorse this view, we take the opportunity here to deduce a number of suggestions 
from our case study for future geographical investigations of the variegated and financialized 
capitalisms of today and tomorrow. For one there is a pressing need to come to grips with the plurality 
of finance in what the World Bank has recently called a ‘multipolar world’ (World Bank, 2011), 
marked by the absence of a hegemon that possesses the power to enforce upon societies elsewhere its 
visions of the future, either through hard or soft power (Nye, 2004). As the World Bank report 
sketches with regard to monetary policies, suggesting a multicurrency world instead of a world that is 
dominated by the dollar, our case study too suggests a future of multiple jurisdictions that are 
increasingly vertically linked, allowing for multiple negotiations of financial agents across the 
boundaries of those jurisdictions, resulting in highly uneven forms of financial ‘bricolage’ that break 
with the simple core-periphery logic that underlies notions of isomorphism and its absence. This 
means that we need to reconceptualise the world of finance as an increasingly symmetrical field 
where the ability of agents to set the norm is not determined by country of origin, but by market 
reputation that might not survive the next crisis. In a flagrant break with Economics 101 textbooks, 
our case demonstrates that there is no pure form of securitization. Instead there are different regional, 
national and even local variations, which use seemingly similar techniques to slightly different ends.  
As our case study suggest, then, there is a pressing need to go beyond the hidden assumptions of 
modernization theory writ large which are especially dominant in the discipline of economics, with its 
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pretension of academic neutrality, its positivist ethos and its claim to universal law-like 
generalizations. Engaging with economics, as is the remit of this journal (Arnott and Wrigley, 2001; 
Wrigley and Overman, 2010), could easily seduce geographers to forget the humbling lessons from 
earlier engagements with the other social sciences. These were lessons of self-reflexivity, complexity, 
conditional causation and a world that largely escapes quantification and modeling. On the back of 
this we want to close with hesitantly raising the question whether an ongoing engagement with 
economics is worth the effort if it requires geographers to endorse its assumptions and mimic its 
ethos. For not only has it been a one way dialogue – from geography to economics with not much 
talking back from economists, as has been ruefully noted on a number of occasions in this journal 
(Brakman et al., 2011; Garretsen and Martin, 2011; Wrigley and Overman, 2010) – the crisis too has 
indicated an urgent need on the side of academic economics to revisit some of its deeply buried core 
postulates: from its conceptualization of agency to its notion of markets to its empiricist philosophy of 
science to its politics of top down engineering. We confess to a certain disaffection with the 
asymmetrical project of gaining the ear of economists. Instead, we would like to suggest to broaden 
the conversation again and invite cultural anthropologists, organizational sociologists, political 
scientists (back) to the table – as well as those economists that have demonstrated to put empirical 
complexity above paradigmatic parsimony (mostly those working in slightly ‘tacky’ subfields like 
labor or developmental economics (see Card and Krueger, 1995; Rodrik, 2008). Indeed, if the crisis 
has taught us anything it is that we neglect the fact of social complexity at our own peril. That is a 
lesson that comes easier to geographers than economists. 
Acknowledgements 
This work was supported by the Research Foundation – Flanders [Grant No. 3G066408]. We thank 
Anna Glasmacher for pointing out discrepancies between Islamic and ‘conventional’ securitization 
techniques. Further, we also thank two anonymous referees for their insightful comments on earlier 
versions of this paper. Evidently, we are responsible for all remaining errors.  
 
References 
24 
 
Aalbers, M., Engelen, E., Glasmacher, A. (2011) Mortgage Securitization and the State: ‘Cognitive 
Closure’ in the Netherlands. Environment and Planning A, 43 (8), 1179-1795. 
Agha, O. (2009) Islamic finance: Principle before profit. Berkeley Journal of Middle Eastern Islamic 
Law, 2 (1): 125-135. 
Albertazzi, U., Eramo, G., Gambacorta, L., Salleo, C. (2011) Securitization is not that evil after all. 
BIS Working Papers no. 341. 
Appadurai, A. (1996) Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Arnott, R , Wrigley, N. (2001) Editorial. Journal of Economic Geography, 1 (1): 1-4. 
Bassens, D., Derudder, B., Witlox, F. (2010a) Searching for the Mecca of finance: Islamic financial 
services and the world city network. Area, 42 (1): 35-46. 
Bassens, D., Derudder, B., Witlox, F. (2010b) The making and breaking of Dubai: the end of a city-
state? Political Geography, 32 (6): 299-301. 
Bassens, D., Derudder, B., Witlox, F. (2011a) Oiling global capital accumulation: analyzing the 
principles, practices and geographical distribution of Islamic financial services. Service Industries 
Journal, 31 (3): 327-341. 
Bassens, D., Derudder, B., Witlox, F. (2011b) Setting Shari’a standards: on the role, power and 
spatialities of interlocking Shari’a boards in Islamic financial services. Geoforum, 42 (1): 94-103. 
Bassens, D., Derudder, B., Witlox, F. (2012) ‘Gatekeepers’ of Islamic financial circuits: analyzing 
urban geographies of the global Shari’a elite. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 
published online, doi: 10.1080/08985626.2011.577820. 
Beaverstock, J. V., Faulconbridge, J., Hall, S. J. E. (2010) Professionalization, legitimization and the 
creation of executive search markets in Europe. Journal of Economic Geography, 10 (6): 825-843. 
Behrendt, S. (2008) When money talks: Arab sovereign wealth funds in the global public policy 
discourse. Carnegie papers from Carnegie Middle East Centre, 12. Washington DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. 
Brakman, S., Garretsen, H., van Marrewijk, C. (2011) References across the fence: measuring the 
dialogue between economists and geographers. Journal of Economic Geography, 11 (2): 371-385. 
Brenner, N., Peck, J., Theodore, N. (2010) Variegated neoliberalization: geographies, modalities, 
pathways. Global Networks, 10 (2): 182-222. 
Callon, M. (1998) Introduction: the embeddedness of economic markets in economics. In The laws of 
the markets, M. Callon (Ed.): 1-57, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Card, D, Krueger, A. (1995) Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of The Minimum Wage. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Clark, G. L. (2005) Money flows like mercury: the geography of global finance. Geografiska Annaler 
Series B – Human Geography, 87B (2): 99-112. 
Clark, G. L., Dixon, A. D., Monk, A. H. B. (2010b) Introduction. In Managing Financial Risks: From 
Global to Local, G. L Clark, A. D. Dixon, A. H. B. Monk (Eds.): 1-23, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Clark, G. L., Monk, A., Dixon, A., Pauly, L. W., Faulconbridge, J., Yeung, H. W. C., Behrendt, S. 
(2010a) Symposium: sovereign fund capitalism. Environment and Planning A, 42 (9): 2271-2291. 
Daud Bakar, M. (2010) Sukuk structures. Retrieved September 8, 2010, from http://www.zawya.com. 
Derudder, B., Hoyler, M, Taylor, P. J. (2011) Goodbye Reykjavik: international banking centres and 
the global financial crisis. Area, 43 (2), 173-182. 
DiMaggio, P. J., Powell, W. W. (1983) The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48 (2): 147-160. 
Djelic, M.-L. (1998) Exporting the American model: the post-war transformation of European 
business. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
25 
 
Djelic, M.-L., Quack, S. (2007) Overcoming path dependency: path generation in open systems. 
Theory & Society, 36 (2): 161-186 
Dubai Chronicle (2011) Emaar successfully executes first international fixed-income offering of 
US$500 million, www.dubaichronicle.com, accessed online May 31st 2011. 
Eisenstadt, S. N. (2000) Multiple Modernities. Daedalus, 129 (1): 1-29. 
El-Gamal, M. A. (2006) Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Engelen, E., Erturk, I., Froud, J., Leaver, A., Williams, K. (2010) Reconceptualizing financial 
innovation: frame, conjuncture and bricolage. Economy and Society, 39 (1): 33-63. 
Faulconbridge, J. R., Muzio, D. (2009) The financialization of large law firms: situated discourses and 
practices of reorganization. Journal of Economic Geography, 9 (5): 641-661. 
Frankel, A., Gyntelberg, J., Kjeldsen, K., Persson, M., (2004) The Danish Mortgage Market. BIS 
Quarterly Review March 2004.  
FT (2011) Emaar seeks to ease debt with $500m bond, www.ft.com, accessed online May 20th 2011. 
Garretsen, H., Martin, R. (2011) The Journal of Economic Geography a decade on: where do we go 
from here? Journal of Economic Geography, 11 (2), 207-213. 
Hall, S. (2006) What Counts? Exploring the production of quantitative financial narratives in 
London’s corporate finance industry. Journal of Economic Geography, 6 (5): 661-678. 
Hall, S. (2008) Geographies of business education: MBA programmes, reflexive business schools and 
the cultural circuit of capital. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 33 (1): 27-41. 
Hall, S., Appleyard, L. (2009) ‘City of London, city of learning?’ Placing business education within 
the geographies of finance. Journal of Economic Geography, 9 (5): 597-617. 
Hassan, M., Dridi, J. (2010) The Effects of the Global Crisis on Islamic and Conventional Banks: A 
Comparative Study. IMF Working Paper 10/201. 
IIFM (2010) Sukuk report: a comprehensive study of the international sukuk market. Retrieved 
September 15, 2010, from http://www.iifm.net. 
Jobst, A. A. (2007) The Economics of Islamic Finance and Securitization. IMF Working Paper 
07/117. 
Jobst, A. A. (2008) Back to basics - What is securitization? Finance & development, 45 (3): 48-49. 
Kerr, A. (1960) Industrialism and Industrial Man. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Khan, F. (2010) How ‘Islamic’ is Islamic Banking? Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, 
76 (3), 805-820. 
Knauft, B. (Ed.) (2002) Critically Modern: Alternatives, Alterities, Anthropologies. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
Lai, K. P. Y. (2006) ‘Imagineering’ Asian emerging markets: financial knowledge networks in the 
fund management industry. Geoforum, 37: 627-642. 
Leyshon, A., Thrift, N. (2007) The capitalization of almost everything: the future of finance and 
capitalism. Theory, Culture, and Society, 24 (7-8): 97-115. 
Maurer, B. (2005) Mutual Life, Limited: Islamic Banking, Alternative Currencies, Lateral Reason. 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Nye, J. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in the World. Washington: Foreign Affairs. 
Palan, R., Murphy, R., Chavagneux, C. (2010) Tax Havens: How Globalization Really Works. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Parsons, T (1966) Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives. London: Prentice Hall. 
Pieterse, J. N. (2000) After post-development. Third World Quarterly, 21 (2): 175-191. 
Pollard, J., Samers, M. (2007) Islamic banking and finance: postcolonial political economy and the 
decentring of economic geography. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 32 (3): 
313-330. 
26 
 
Rajapakse, P. J. (2005) Residential Mortgage Securitisation: The Australian Perspective. Global Jurist 
Topics, 5 (3), available online http://www.bepress.com/gj/topics/vol5/iss3/art1. 
Rodrik, D. (2008) One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 
Rostow, W. (1960) The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Sheppard, E. (2011) Geography, nature, and the question of development. Dialogues in Human 
Geography, 1 (1): 46-75. 
Sidaway, J. D., Bryson, J. R. (2002) Constructing knowledges of ‘emerging markets’: UK-based 
investment managers and their overseas connections. Environment and Planning A, 34 (3): 401-
416. 
Sidaway, J. D., Pryke, M. (2000) The strange geographies of ‘emerging markets’. Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers, 25 (2): 187–201.  
Steinmetz, G. (Ed.) (2005) The Politics of Method in the Social Sciences: Positivism and its 
Epistemological Others. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Taylor, P. J., Ni, P., Derudder, B., Hoyler, M., Huang, J., Lu, F. Y., Pain, K., Witlox, F., Yang, X, 
Bassens, D., Shen, W. (2009). The way we were: command-and-control centres in the global 
space-economy on the eve of the 2008 geo-economic transition. Environment and Planning A, 41 
(1): 7–12.  
The World Bank (2011) Global Development Horizons 2011. Multipolarity: The New Global 
Economy. Washington: World Bank. 
Thomas, A., Cox, S., Kraty, B. (Eds.) (2005) Structuring Islamic Finance Transactions. London: 
Euromoney Books.  
Wainwright, T. (2009) Laying the foundations for a crisis: mapping the historico-geographical 
construction of residential mortgage backed securitization in the UK. International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research, 33 (2): 372-378. 
Wilson, R. (2004) Overview of the sukuk market. In Islamic Bonds: Your Guide to Issuing, 
Structuring, and Investing in Sukuk, J. A. Nathif, T. Abdulkader (Eds.): 3-17, London: Euromoney 
Books. 
Wrigley, N., Overman, H. (2010) The 10th year of the Journal of Economic Geography: A decade of 
high impact publication. Journal of Economic Geography, 10 (1): 1-8. 
Yeung, H. (2004) Chinese Capitalism in a Global Era: Towards Hybrid Capitalism. London: 
Routledge. 
Zeitlin, J., Herrigel, G. (2000) Americanization and its limits: reworking US technology and 
management in post-war Europe and Japan. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
